There has never been any doubt that Ukraine was the focus of an intelligence war as much as a physical one. But the extent of Western assistance, as well as growing concern at some Ukrainian tactics, is only now becoming clear.
On Monday, the Washington Post ran a lengthy examination of the level of CIA assistance for the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) and military intelligence (HUR) that bore all the hallmarks of being facilitated by the US government. It acknowledged that since the annexation of Crimea in 2014, the Americans has invested ‘tens of millions’ of dollars in training and technical assistance for their Ukrainian counterparts, even building new headquarters for HUR’s special forces, for fear that the old ones were compromised.
There is often a ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ understanding at work, allowing the West to maintain a clear conscience
Kyiv is now increasingly acknowledging, however, that the SBU and HUR are behind a growing campaign of sabotage and assassinations inside Russia – something the Americans appear eager to dissociate themselves from. Indeed, part of the reason why the US government may have smiled on the Washington Post’s article seems to have been to try and warn Kyiv of the risks of such an approach.
Reportedly, for example, the CIA equipped HUR with technical capabilities to tap and track mobile communications in the Russian-held Donbas region shortly after 2014. These were used to set up assassinations of pro-Russian leaders such as the notorious militia commander Mikhail ‘Givi’ Tolstykh in 2017 by the SBU. Such figures were generally considered legitimate targets.
Since then, though, the Ukrainians have extended their range of targets to figures providing moral support for the invasion, including the blogger Vladlen Tatarsky and nationalist philosopher Alexander Dugin (although instead they actually killed his daughter, Daria). All of this is part of a wider campaign to bring the war home to the Russians.
This has disconcerted the Americans. First of all, some are concerned that Moscow will consider this analogous to the use of Western-provided weapons against targets in mainland Russia and cause for direct retaliation. As one European intelligence official noted, ‘so far, we have been surprised that the Russians have not been more aggressive in sabotage operations here. In part this is because their networks have been heavily degraded, but it also represents a policy decision. I would hate the see the Kremlin change its mind.’ Although the claim is that US-supplied assets and resources have not been used in these attacks, this is implausible given the degree to which the SBU and HUR now use them throughout their operations.
It also reflects a belief that assassinations, sabotage and performative drone attacks like the strike on the Kremlin before Victory Day celebrations in May may actually consolidate support in Russia behind the war. A State Department analyst said that ‘most Russians are not buying attempts to sell the war to them as a vital national struggle. [Such attacks] could do a better job of that than any number of Putin’s speeches.’ The analyst added ‘apart from the fact that they missed him, going after a blowhard like Dugin, whose practical importance is zero, makes this look more like revenge than strategy.’
Nor is this just an American issue. According to the Washington Post, to maintain operational security, a new, fifth directorate of the SBU was established to manage coordination with the Americans, and then a sixth for working with the British. The UK’s intelligence community plays a role second only the CIA in Ukraine, ranging from providing instruction for Kyiv’s special forces to sharing the gleanings of its espionage operations.
Of course, the Kremlin is doing what it can to make hay of this, with spokesman Dmitry Peskov claiming that ‘our special services have known for a long time’ that Ukraine’s services are ‘under the close supervision of… the intelligence services of the United States and Britain.’ The irony is that, rather than ‘supervising’ the Ukrainian agencies, neither London nor Washington often know what they intend next.
There is much very fruitful mutual collaboration these days, and the Ukrainians have proven as imaginative and capable in the intelligence war as on the battlefield. However, there are also clear limits not only to what we pass on to the Ukrainians but also vice versa. It has been clear for some time that there is often a ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ understanding at work, allowing the West to maintain a clear conscience by avoiding knowing what Kyiv planned next. It may well be, though, that DC, at least, is coming to realise that ignorance is not always bliss.
Source: The Spectator